The current European debate – led by the UK, France, and Germany – suggests a timeframe of several months for maintaining a naval presence once a stable agreement is in place. This appears unrealistic for three reasons. While any projection remains speculative, the coalition’s naval presence is likely to remain in place for at least two to five years.
Sole military options are proving inadequate to re-open the Strait. Strategic thinking on diplomatic solutions are needed. The EU’s experience and leadership could be key.
The attention given to the Red Sea Houthi attacks has come at a price. Decision-makers in Brussels have not yet noted that another problem in this region has returned. The pirates of Somalia are also back in action.
Acts of sabotage on wind farms or the underwater electricity grid are likely to be carried out as ‘grey zone tactics’, state-sponsored sabotage may be disguised as a civilian accident, or carried out from a leisure yacht or fishing boat.
The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines was the first major attack on European maritime infrastructure. But while the EU Commission has a critical infrastructure directive in the works, it largely focuses on cybersecurity —not physical attacks.